The reason I say he is a “real” climate change skeptic is because I think that the term “skeptic” should be reserved for people who apply a skeptical view methodically and with the purpose of increasing knowledge. I think that this its greatest value. Most people who are suspicious of climate change are not suspicious for reasons of rigorous skepticism.

Some, and I think this includes my dear Buck… and maybe RW… are skeptical in the sense of “I don’t know what to think. Too many claims and counterclaims, and I just can’t keep track of them.” This is commendable, and a good example of folk skepticism. The truth is that the world is too big & complex for each person to establish for him or her self, with reasonable certainty, the truth of a lot of issues – including a lot of important ones. This type of skepticism is a hedge against wrong belief, and it makes sense for people who find it important to avoid poorly justified beliefs. In other words, it often seems more valuable to have a few true and well justified beliefs along with very few wrong beliefs than to have many true but poorly justified beliefs along with very many wrong ones.

I am a folk skeptic myself, but feel I have been able to navigate the claims and counterclaims of climate science and and have justified for myself a belief in the general conclusions of the vast majority of scientists who study climate.

I don’t think that folk skepticism should designate one a “skeptic” where it concerns climate change. This skepticism is a passive one, a choice for agnosticism on one issue in favor of spending the energy of unraveling questions for another group of tasks. It is not the active skepticism that does take the time to truly analyze the claims and require justification of them. I would rather style this type of folk skeptic who does not accept climate change science “agnostic.”

Some people who are suspicious of climate change (and I think this includes many political operatives) are suspicious because they are incapable of thinking of any issue except in terms of partisan advantage and gamesmanship – or at least in terms of partisan trust. This is not skepticism in any positive sense of the word. So, I don’t think the term should be applied to the bloggers, media personalities and political think-tanks that try to undermine popular understanding of climate science. I have a similar view toward those who are active in the climate science debate in order to preserve an economic interest in a polluting industry.

There are a few are old-guard climate researchers who are just tough to budge when it comes to a new result, especially one they didn’t see coming. Perhaps these individuals include real, rigorous, scientific skeptics. The modern-day classic example of a skeptic of this sort – from another field – is that of Alan Feduccia. While folks like Dr. Feduccia deserve respect for their contributions to science, and deserve to have their view heard in the academic debate, they are extremely few in number where it comes to birds and dinosaurs (for instance) or climate science. So, while I count them among climate change “skeptics”, I count them as a trifling minority thereof.

I think that most people who are suspicious of climate change are victims of the Dunning-Kruger effect, perhaps combined with a political or religious bias. This is based on observation. In my younger days, I trolled the halls of internet Creationism, and I there observed two things in great quantity – 1) large numbers of internet Creationists are victims of the Dunning-Kruger effect (almost always in tandem with religious bias), and 2) self-styled climate change skeptics on the internet today exist in large numbers and exhibit behavior very similar to that of internet Creationists (and not a few of them are Creationists). And, by the way – that link is the one that goes to the “real climate change skeptic”.

Skepticism is a key element in science. This is so much the case that I don’t believe science would be possible without it. So the real champions of scientific skepticism are the scientists themselves. It is climate scientists: both the large majority who accept AGW and the vanishingly small minority who reject it or hedge their acceptance dramatically, who have truly earned the term “climate change skeptic”.

I also think there is room for us folk skeptics in the mix. Folk skeptics, relying largely on the efforts of scientists, who go to an effort of critical justification for their views on climate science, might also deserve a junior badge of “climate change skeptic”.

I say all of this, and deny the term “skeptic” to the majority of disbelievers of climate change – to preserve the integrity of the word “skeptic”. The rest should be designated as worthy agnostics or as pestilent contrarians, depending on their respective beliefs and activities.

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Posted in: Philosophy, Sci/Tech
Post tags: Climate Change, Skepticism

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My first thought goes to the religious angle. John is an Evangelical (and reasonably conservative) Christian. As such, it is worth noting that his attitude toward retribution as justice is – if I read him right (which is often hard for me to do because his communication style is often very… “poetic”, and sometimes I find him hard to pin down) – a negative one. If I do read him right then I would want to keep that in my pocket for later discussions. I would like to show evidence that non-retributivism is not a “secular liberal” viewpoint – and such attitudes and arguments from conservative Christians serve as good evidence for that point.

This is especially important in discussions of doctrines of Hell. Most defenses of traditional notions of Hell rely on the notion that God is Just and that his Justice is a retributive one, though that latter point is normally obscured as much as possible from the defense itself if not from the consciousness of the person presenting it.

As discussed before, one’s theory of what properly constitutes justice should inform one’s view on whether or how retribution can serve the cause of or even be considered as justice. In Hobbins’ case, his objection to retribution doesn’t seem to derive from a theory of justice quite so much as it does from a theory of Scripture, but I’ll take what I can get here. My contention is that upon reflection, no theoretical system of justice that reflective, modern thinkers would find worthy of the name allows for the derivation of an important role for retribution – and certainly none would allow for retribution to be defined as justice.

Hobbins mentions the potential role of retribution in bringing “closure” for family victims of “Capital” crimes in terms suggestive of a Trojan horse. Whether or not that is its intended goal, it is an interesting puzzle. Should we take a family victim’s self-analysis as sufficient reason to consider that retribution has a restorative role in bringing closure? I don’t know – I’m skeptical on this – but more importantly, even if we do acknowledge that role, we are not advocating retribution qua retribution, but rather on the theory that it plays a restitutional role (one that could not possibly apply to arguments on the traditional doctrines of hell, for instance).

I think, whether Hobbins has also considered the question in terms of ethical theories of justice or not, he and I would agree that real justice is essentially preservative, preventative and restorative in nature. In other words, a just effort is one that seeks to preserve what is right, prevent wrong from happening, and to restore the right when a wrong has been done – all while avoiding greater wrongs.

Where I believe we differ a tad is on the political side of the question. I quote:

On the other hand, the fact that redistributive justice – which those same people usually affirm – is a type of retributive justice is almost universally overlooked. You know, progressive taxation, affirmative action, things like that. The feeling seems to be that redistributive justice cannot be a form of retributive justice.

I find this statement extremely revealing of a difference in perspective between advocates and detractors of what Hobbins calls “redistributive” justice.

In fairness to his view, there is a contingent among advocates of progressive taxation or affirmative action that do hold and argue for a retributive role for both – especially for affirmative action, when you consider the “reparations” movement and ’60′s radicalism.

In fairness to the rest of us and myself, it is neither necessary nor particularly common to advocate progressivism with the motive of retribution. In fact, I view progressive taxation exclusively in terms of preservative justice – maintaining a right economic system by avoiding the systematic or institutional transfer of un-earned riches into the hands of the wealthy and out of the reach of the nation that helped produce them and needs them to continue to live and function.

That isn’t to say that none of my political or economic opinions have room for punitive measures against wealthy abusers, or that my temperament doesn’t sometimes allow me retributive feelings against the same. But I don’t feel that wealth is itself an abuse and I am capitalist enough that I salute the industry of those who have achieved it. It is admiration that figures into my view of those wealthy, not retribution. And it is preservation that wholly informs my support for progressivism.

That this conservative sees progressivism as a form of retribution explains why he would take a dim view of progressivism. And it shows that there is a real communication breakdown between the progressive and conservative sides.

In any case – I’m glad to share with Hobbins a skepticism about enthusiasm for retribution. Human nature is such that the desire for it is – as Jesus said of the poor – always going to be with us. Research shows that the desire to punish wrong-doers is a strong psychological pre-disposition in humans, and suggests an evolutionary explanation for why this is so. Experience teaches us that most of us will justify those desires and the expressions of them by looking at them as elements of a worthwhile cause, such as justice.

We won’t rid ourselves of the desire to return ill for ill. But, we can reason better about that desire. We can recognize it as an emotion – even as a legitimate emotion. At the same time, we can recognize that it does not fit a properly understood theory of justice. We can recognize that indulging that emotion, in many cases, can be contrary to justice and contrary to a well-ordered society.

So, if any progressives out there advocate “redistributive” justice (for lack of a better word) out of a visceral desire for retribution as Hobbins perceives, it’s worth taking a second look at your goals and priorities. If advocates of the death penalty have retaliation mixed in amongst your justifications for it, it’s worth revisiting the role emotion plays in your theory of justice. And, if you are defending a traditional notion of Hell on the basis that God is “Just”, it’s worth spending some time figuring out what “justice” is, and whether the quintessentially human desire for revenge is really properly called by that name.

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Posted in: Justice, People, Philosophy, Religion
Post tags: retribution

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It’s true there is a certain amount of scriptural support for that, but it occurs to me that, as with many issues, there is also scriptural support for the other view – a more pure Divine Command theory. What happens if God commands something that is against the moral standard essential to his character that is the ultimate grounding under that apologetic view? Does a scriptural religion demand that we follow the objective moral standard of God’s essence, or follow his command?

If you accept the story of Abraham and Isaac as told in Genesis, the answer is that Christian morality follows the ungrounded command, rather than the objective moral standard of God’s character. Certainly Abraham’s faith, demonstrated in his willingness to murder his son, was accounted to him as righteousness.

So, I should have been clear that among the many problems I mentioned with that apologetic response, its representation of scriptural faith also must rank somewhere.

And really that’s the Absolute Bloody Final word from me on the apologetic angle on moral philosophy.

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I certainly don’t blame the apologist for misusing philosophy, as it is difficult to treat fairly on its own terms even without apologetic agendas setting a hindrance. Further, moral philosophy carries with it a perplexing array of bootstrap problems that make it near impossible to wade through even under the best of circumstances. So, it is understandable when apologists misuse it, as they have often done in Christian apologetics. Understand when I start linking and critiquing, that I do not mean to show contempt – I only seek to expose mistakes that are extremely easy to make.

The inspiration for this post, and the next few in the series I will be making, comes from here. In future posts in this series, I will have a lot more to say about various moral theories, including relativism. I won’t engage directly with the “seven fatal flaws” of moral relativism. Instead, I will acknowledge that there are difficulties with moral relativism, while trying to better explain what it is and why some philosophers adopt it. I will also discuss the pro’s and con’s of a small variety of other types of moral theory. But before I do, I want to try to get the apologetic/counter-apologetic argument behind us. And I want to begin by pointing out the one “fatal flaw” with the “seven fatal flaws” approach to relativism. That flaw is this: none of the “seven deadly flaws” addresses the truth of moral relativism. We will find that it is extremely difficult to have even the most rudimentary discussion of moral philosophy without confusing “is” and “ought”. Without discussing whether the flaws attributed to moral relativism are correctly stated, we can take them for the sake of argument and acknowledge that they would give us reason to be dissatisfied with moral relativism if they are correctly formulated. But, they would not tell us whether moral relativism is true or not. There are many things in this world that we find disappointing and dissatisfying. That does not make them untrue.

Allow me a brief tangent. I personally espouse a very limited form moral realism on some matters, and moral relativism on others. I cannot blame a person for espousing moral realism on all matters. I will eventually present my reasoning, complete with its own difficulties – including the inevitable blurring of the line between “is” and “ought”, and will criticize no one who rejects my reasoning in favor of reasoning more similar to that of Greg Koukl or Roger Morris.

Going back to the apologetic angle… I have presented Euthyphro’s dilemma before to show that Divine Command theory has no advantage over moral relativism, and I suggested the same in Roger’s comments. Roger responded both in his comments and in a subsequent post with a standard apologetic effort to keep a theistic upper hand over secularistic moral relativism.

Euthyphro’s dilemma is similar to the “deadly flaws” in that it does not make arguments about the truth of any proposition; it only makes arguments about the consequences of certain propositions.
The proposition under discussion – Divine Command theory, more or less – has unfortunate consequences for the apologist, but we are left to discern whether it is true by other means entirely. Yet, I take it up, not because I think it greatly furthers the discussion of moral philosophy, but because it helps us to deal with the consequentialist apologetics. It doesn’t show us the truth of one system or another, but shows us that the consequences we fear in one are no more avoidable in the other.

Briefly, Divine Command theory states that it is good to obey God’s commands. Euthyphro’s dilemma is this: is it good to obey God’s commands simply because he commands them, or does God command as he does because those commands are good? If the former, then the unfortunate consequence is that God could command acts that we believe to be evil, and thereby make them good – for instance, he could command rape or the killing of babies, and it would be evil for us to disobey. If it is the latter, then the unfortunate consequence is only for the religious apologist: God must rely on an objective and independent standard of goodness in order to make his commands. Since that standard must exist before God can make his commands, then it exists logically prior to God. Such an objective standard can exist without God.

The question now is this: does the apologist successfully avoid the dilemma by positing that God does appeal to an objective standard, but one that does not exist independently of Himself, grounded instead in His (good) character? I say he only manages to postpone, and possibly multiply, the unfortunate consequences.

First, we find that this again confuses “is” with “ought”. We might find that God’s character is a certain way, but we have yet to see whether that means we “ought” to act in accordance with it. But, this may be the least of the trouble for this theory.

By making God’s character serve as the standard of goodness, we risk a tautological system. If we have no external standard against which to judge God’s goodness, then we cannot mean that he is “good” in any real, objective sense. We can only say that goodness is whatever God is. Here we might revisit the “seven fatal flaws” and ruminate over whether it is praiseworthy merely to be whatever you are – or blameworthy merely to not be whatever you are not. If God’s character is goodness, and created beings are by definition not God, then they are by definition – and by creation – not good. Can blame be assigned to someone for being what they were created to be: other than God, and therefore other than good?

Furthermore, and more importantly, it leaves us with the same dilemma that Euthyphro presented, only asked differently: could God’s character be other than it is? Could God’s character be such that rape and infanticide were good, while refraining from them are not? If it could not be, then there is an objective standard – logically prior to God’s character – that constrains God’s character. If it could be, then we are returned to a difficult arbitrariness, only now it does not stem from God’s choices, but from his character.

That’s enough for today. The next post in this series will have some overlap with the apolgetic angle, as it will deal with the question of whether certain “objective” moral standards carry some of the same difficulties we find in the “seven deadly flaws” arguments, because the are only subjectively considered to be “objective”. But hopefully we will be able to get past that particular bootstrap problem and deal with some other interesting problems.

I will close this post by explaining the title. I call this Euthyphro’s lament because it is fair to say that no moral philosophy is without problems. The problems are various – self-reference, the confusion of “is” and “ought”, lack of philosophical grounding, or simply the possibility of moral conclusions that do violence to our moral intuitions. In other words, the difficulties of moral philosophy are lamentable, and not only because they fail to support apologetic or counter-apologetic agendas.

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Posted in: Philosophy
Post tags: Morality

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